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Abstract 
 
Different cultures produce different privacies – both 
architecturally and legally speaking – as well as in their 
different legal architectures. The ‘Simms principle’ can be 
harnessed to produce semi-constitutional privacy protection 
through statute; building on the work already done in ‘bringing 
rights home’ through the Human Rights Act 1998. This article 
attempts to set out a notion of semi-entrenched legal rights, 
which will help to better portray the case for architectural, 
constitutional privacy, following an examination of the 
problems with a legal narrative for privacy rights as they 
currently exist. I will use parallel ideas from the works of W.B. 
Yeats and Costas Douzinas to explore and critique these 
assumptions and arguments. The ultimate object of this piece 
is an argument for the creation of a legal instrument, namely 
an Act of Parliament, in the United Kingdom; the purpose of 
which is to protect certain notions of personal privacy from 
politically-motivated erosion and intrusion.  
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Introduction 
 
This article may be overly ambitious, as it touches on a 
good number of themes, but the ultimate object of this piece is 
an argument for the creation of a legal instrument, namely an 
Act of Parliament, in the United Kingdom; the purpose of 
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which is to protect certain notions of personal privacy from 
politically-motivated erosion and intrusion. The ambition 
motivating this article arises from the need to explore ideas 
and concepts of (chiefly) legal narratology, legal architecture, 
human rights, the nature of legal rules and constitutional 
instruments, cultural variations of the expression of personal 
privacy, and the proffered definitions of personal privacy 
themselves. The challenge of this exploration of ideas is the 
envisaging of a switch from a legal narrative epistemology of 
laws to an architectural epistemology of laws: the shape of 
privacy law becoming not a succession of narratives but the 
creation of an edifice of privacy law. 
 
 
A Flawed Notion of ‘Legalised’ Rights? 
 
First, I would like to set out a notion of ‘legalised’ rights 
which will help, in turn, to better portray the case for 
architectural, constitutional privacy following an examination 
of the problems with a legal narrative for privacy rights as 
currently exists. 
 
There can be said to be “will-rights” and “legal rights.” 
”Will-rights are universal and sweeping as they stem from 
personhood and rational autonomy. 
 
This is autonomy as boundless self-governance – it does not 
work, empirically, in the world of politics, or in the common 
law, even where legal realism can be observed and accepted. 
Rights as an expression of autonomy or self-governance are too 
ambitious.1 These autonomy or rationality-based rights are 
notoriously hard to apply or define for jurists and judges alike. 
 
There are continuous, derisive popular and academic calls 
that concepts of rights are too wide-reaching or are too often 
“engaged” as rights can be described as overlapping, not just 
abutting. As Schofield describes: “In an age where there seems  
  
                                                
1 See e.g.Paul Roberts, Privacy, Autonomy, and Criminal Justice Rights: 
Philosophical Preliminaries, in PERSONAL AUTONOMY, THE PRIVATE SPHERE AND 
CRIMINAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 77 (Peter Alldridge & Chrisje H. Brants, 
eds. 2001).    
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to be a ‘right’ to almost anything, asserting a claim of right is 
less helpful than it once was, because the basis for evaluating 
the importance of a particular right has become lost in the 
chorus of competing rights . . . .”2 
 
So the legal formalist is pleased to note that many 
expressions of legal rights are of course instrumental – they are 
document or constitution-based; as in the case of each of the 
human rights articulated in the UK, between the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)3 and the Human Rights 
Act of 1998 (HRA).4 
 
These instrumental human rights (legal rights) leave us, as 
individuals, with different spheres or avenues of liberty. These 
can be conceived of as realms of hurma, or “sanctity,” to 
borrow an Arabic phrase.5 The courts rigorously examine the 
width of these avenues – in defining the scope of our rights, 
through such mechanisms as measuring the engagement of 
different articles of the ECHR. 
 
The “sanctities” we are granted by our legislature through 
legal instruments include, in the UK, a “right to private and 
family life” due to the operation of Art. 8 of the ECHR and of 
the HRA. We are given discretion to exercise our “decisional 
privacy.’’6 Many authors have suggested that the recognition of 
‘decisional privacy’ through the enforcement of Article 8 rights 
is, at least in the UK, a recognition of personal autonomy. For 
example, autonomy is a theme that emerges from the 
discussion of informational privacy by the UK Court of Appeal 
in Wood v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis 
[2009] EWCA Civ 414. The truth is something similar, but not 
quite. Legal rights granted by legal instruments leave us with 
discretion in self-determination, rather than true autonomy. I 
would suggest that “decisional privacy” is most accurately 
equated to this notion of self-determination as opposed to 
autonomy or self-governance. 
                                                
2G.R. SCHOFIELD, Privacy (or Liberty) and Assisted Suicide, 6 .J. PAIN & SYMPTOM 
MGM’T. 5, 280 (1991). 
3 http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html.   
4 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents.  
5 See FADWA EL GUINDI, VEIL: MODESTY, PRIVACY AND RESISTANCE 84-85 (1999) 
(The notion of a hurma or ‘sanctity’ can be conceptually linked to that of 
something, which is haram or ‘forbidden.’ El Guindi describes “traditional notions 
of Arab privacy” including the “right to see whom,” the “right not to be seen by 
whom,” and the notion of “who chooses not to see whom.”).  
6 See DANIEL SOLOVE, ET AL., PRIVACY, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY 1 (2006) 
for a brief explanation of decisional privacy. 
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However, a porous constitutional arrangement, i.e. a fair 
and distinct separation of powers, allows for judicial mavericks 
to make landmark decisions or commentaries within the 
boundaries, at least, of the constitutional limitations placed 
upon them. Once appointed judges, these individuals, often 
deciding cases as part of an appellate collective, have far 
greater personal autonomy in decision-making than the rest of 
us. This is of course the central tenet or principle of the legal 
realist position.7 We can observe the potential cascading effect 
these more radical decision-makers in the judiciary have upon 
their peers when we examine the language of opinions such as 
that given by Baroness Hale of Richmond, in the Campbell 
case.8 
 
Most of the time, however, it is the legal instrumentalists 
and legal formalists in the judiciary that have their way, out of 
deference of judges to the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty as a flawed expression of popular democracy. 
 
Parliamentary sovereignty is ‘our’ concept in the UK; 
though it will be mirrored broadly in some jurisdictions 
globally. The application and defence of privacy rights in the 
UK courts is, as a result, portrayed as overly-instrumental and 
formalist by decisions in the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). The ECtHR has recently been a better defender of 
‘British’ privacy than our own courts. Cases, such as R (On the 
application of L) v Commissioner of the Police of the 
Metropolis, have seen substantive retreats back down avenues 
of decisional privacy.9 However, there is a notion that 
‘legalising’ privacy is a much-maligned British/UK legal 
obsession, as Sir Thomas Bingham has identified in a scholarly  
  
                                                
7 See http://law.jrank.org/pages/8160/Legal-Realism-Persuasion-Characteristics-
Individual-Judges.html  See http://law.jrank.org/pages/8160/Legal-Realism-
Persuasion-Characteristics-Individual-Judges.html  
8 Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22.  
9 R. (On the application of L) v. Comm’r of the Police of the Metropolis [2009] 
UKSC 3 (where L was held to be lawfully denied employment working with 
children despite an error in her job application revealing that her child, X, had once 
been taken into social care at L’s own behest).  
Vol. 4, Issue 1 
 
36 
 
article,10 and as he highlighted in a speech to the civil liberties 
campaigners Liberty in 2009.11 In this speech, Bingham has 
given us an important view of how and why we must define the 
role and protection of ‘rights’ in our society.  
 
Sir Thomas said: 
 
The rights protected by the [ECHR] and the [HRA] 
deserve to be protected because they are, as I would 
suggest, the basic and fundamental rights which 
everyone in this country ought to enjoy simply by 
virtue of their existence as a human being. Let me 
briefly remind you of the protected rights, some of 
which I have already mentioned. The right to life. 
The right not to be tortured or subjected to inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment. The right 
not to be enslaved. The right to liberty and security 
of the person. The right to a fair trial. The right not 
to be retrospectively penalised. The right to respect 
for private and family life. Freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion. Freedom of expression. 
Freedom of assembly and association. The right to 
marry. The right not to be discriminated against in 
the enjoyment of those rights. The right not to have 
our property taken away except in the public interest 
and with compensation. The right of fair access to 
the country’s educational system. The right to free 
elections. 
 
Which of these rights, I ask, would we wish to 
discard? Are any of them trivial, superfluous, 
unnecessary? Are any them un-British? There may 
be those who would like to live in a country where 
these rights are not protected, but I am not of their 
number. Human rights are not, however, protected 
for the likes of people like me – or most of you. They 
are protected for the benefit above all of society’s 
outcasts, those who need legal protection because  
  
                                                
10 See generally T. Bingham, Should There Be a Law to Protect Rights of Personal 
Privacy?, 5 E.H.R.L.R. 450, 455-462 (1996).  
11 Lord Bingham, Speech to the organisation Liberty (Jun. 6, 2009) available at 
http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/media/articles/pdfs/lord-bingham-speech-
final.pdf.   
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they have no other voice – the prisoners, the 
mentally ill, the gipsies, the homosexuals, the 
immigrants, the asylum-seekers, those who are at 
any time the subject of public obloquy.12 
 
W. J. Waluchow created the fictional linguistic minority of 
the Venusians, inhabitants of the fabled land of Demos, to 
make this same point as Bingham:  within a democracy (be it 
the UK or Waluchow’s fictional Demos) broken into however 
many constituencies (such as Waluchow’s exemplar Athenia), 
there may be such small minorities or even individuals whose 
needs and concerns are so specific that there must be an  
entrenched system of rights to protect them, as democratic 
representation must otherwise become a tyranny of the 
majority. For this author, this clearly shows a concern in 
Waluchow’s work.13 
 
 
A Legal Framework of Privacy in the UK 
 
The legal landscape of privacy in the UK is piecemeal and 
disparate – not a reflection of any joined-up thinking.14 
 
In a monograph concerned with delimiting the law on 
confidentiality in the UK, Paul Stanley comments that a 
universal privacy principle, which the judiciary and 
policymakers could adhere and aspire to, would be preferable 
to what is actually the current state of affairs; namely, a 
fragmented body of various laws, rules and doctrines.15 
 
Stanley has written that the best way to protect and 
entrench, as well as define, a doctrine like confidentiality, or 
even privacy is the 
 
                                                
12 Id.  
13 W.J. WALUCHOW, A COMMON LAW THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: THE LIVING 
TREE 97-106 (2007).  
14 See generally R. THOMAS & M. WALPORT, DATA SHARING REVIEW REPORT, 
INFORMATION COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE (2008) (for a clear critique of the 
misunderstandings and misapprehensions that surround the everyday issues of 
personal privacy in information sharing through electronic governance), available 
at http://www.justice.gov.uk/docs/data-sharing-review-report.pdf.  
15 P. STANLEY, THE LAW OF CONFIDENTIALITY: A RESTATEMENT V, 157-162 
(2008). (Although a single set of doctrines has been applied to various cases 
involving privacy and confidentiality in English law, there has been no consistent 
or systematic treatment of the cases.).  
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English response, which is to adopt a single set of 
principles but apply them with some sensitivity to 
context [and], it is suggested, a defensible one. 
Alternatives, which would attempt to create 
specialised bodies of rules to address different 
situations, would not necessarily produce a more 
satisfactory overall result.16 
 
Unfortunately, when it comes to approaching problems of 
privacy in a conceptual manner, Stanley could hardly be 
pleased. A brief comparison, as follows, of privacy-type rules in 
the law of the UK that relates to a single sphere of the private 
life presents a number of different judicial stances, political 
purposes and legal doctrines with no unifying principle or 
approach between them. 
 
The common law doctrine of confidentiality has been 
hugely broadened since its inception. The notion of “Campbell 
privacy” is a formulation of personal, private life confidentiality 
that is far removed from commercial-type confidentiality.17 A 
great deal has been written about ‘Campbell privacy’ and the 
adjustment of the common law doctrine of confidentiality to 
provide a vehicle for the recognition of privacy-type claims 
involving a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ that should be 
honoured by the courts to protect a private or family life.18 
 
But despite the doctrine of confidentiality being 
broadened at the common law, there exist certain 
policy-driven statutory provisions that affect 
personal privacy through inroads into 
confidentiality. Some of these mean that there are 
substantive non-sequiturs when it comes to privacy 
issues in governance. For example, the “data-
sharing” principle of § 29 (Crime and Taxation) of 
the Data Protection Act 1998 ignores some issues of 
confidentiality in cases of sharing information to  
  
                                                
16 Id. at 162 (2008). 
17 See Arye Schrieber, Confidence Crisis, Privacy Phobia: Why Invasion of Privacy 
Should be Independently Recognised in English Law, 2 Intel. Prop. Q., 2006, at 
160-192; T. Aplin, Commercial Confidences After the Human Rights Act, EUR. 
INTELL. PROP. REV., at 411-419 (2007); see also Hazel H. Carty, An Analysis of the 
Action for Breach of Commercial Confidence, INTEL.  PROP. Q.  2008, at 416-455.  
18 Id. 
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ensure “(a) the prevention or detection of crime, (b) 
the apprehension or prosecution of offenders, or (c) 
the assessment or collection of any tax or duty or of 
any imposition of a similar nature.”19 
 
§ 251 National Health Service Act 2006, for example, sees 
patient information sometimes treated as less than strictly 
confidential in some circumstances where patient privacy is 
trumped by certain, “higher” ends of economic efficiency and 
privilege for medical researchers.20However, for the most part,  
public pressure and media exposure makes data-protection an 
important issue for National Health Service (NHS) 
organisations, along with concern for patient confidentiality, 
and consequently, patient satisfaction and well-being. 
 
As evidence of this, Professor Dame Joan Higgins, formerly 
Chair of the Ethics and Confidentiality Committee (ECC) of the 
National Information Governance Board of the NHS has noted 
that it is difficult to balance the need for the most effective 
health and social care research with the need to respect the 
sensitivities of patient confidentiality. However, there can be 
circumstances where society’s need for effective research in the 
areas that impact upon public health outweighs notions of 
patient rights and confidentiality.  
 
Higgins has outlined how:  
In many ways, the greatest challenge for the ECC in 
the future is the same as the challenge which [the 
Patient Information Advisory Group] faced when it 
began work in 2001. That is how to support high 
quality health care research, using patient 
information, whilst protecting the interests of 
patients and ensuring that their confidentiality is 
not breached. It is about making sure that an 
appropriate balance is achieved between these 
two goals. However, there have been some more 
recent changes which create new pressures. (1) It is 
essential that trust between patients and health care 
professionals, in the NHS, is maintained. Patients 
need to feel that whatever information they share 
with professionals will be held in confidence. If this 
trust is lost then the whole basis of care 
is undermined. Recent losses of sensitive data and 
                                                
19 Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29, § 29 (Eng.).   
20 National Health Service Act, 2006, c. 41, § 251 (Eng.). 
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inappropriate sharing of, and access to, health 
records may be starting to weaken this sense of 
trust. (2) Increasingly, we are seeing requests from 
researchers to 'link' data for different data sets. This 
is essential for certain kinds of research but it also 
increases the risk of breaching confidentiality, not 
just where identifiable information is linked but also 
where anonymised information is linked but 'small 
numbers' (e.g. in specific geographical areas) may 
reveal patients' identities. There is no easy solution 
to this problem. (3) Finally, there is the problem of 
third party information in patients' records. 
Ensuring that the confidentiality of third parties is 
not breached, as well as that of patients, is also a 
particular challenge.21 
 
As Roberto Lattanzi describes it, “the protection of 
individuals in the health care sector [has been extended] from 
habeas corpus to habeas data.”22 Lattanzi is highlighting the 
greater sensitivity with which patient data in the National 
Health Service and the private health sector is being treated – 
whilst the allied medical professions have typically always 
respected patient confidentiality and personal information out 
of respect for the ethical doctrine of non-malfeasance: “Do no 
harm!” 
 
But patient confidentiality and the sanctity of patient 
information, is a barrier to some types of healthcare research, 
particularly where research is being conducted into a condition 
from which relatively few people suffer. Typically, patient 
consent is sought where confidentiality must be circumvented 
by health researchers.  Otherwise, large amounts of personal 
information can be used after they have been anonymised or 
pseudonymised. When patients will not give consent to their 
health records being used for research or the records must be 
used on a larger scale with ‘personal’ qualities still intact 
making patient information still ‘identifiable’ there exists a 
mechanism governed by §251 of the National Health Service 
Act 2006. Under this mechanism, the National Information 
Governance Board (NIGB) of the NHS sanctions “open” 
research without patient consent being necessary, on behalf of 
                                                
21 J. Higgins, Private correspondence with the author (J. Grace), 14 September 
2009. 
22 See Roberto R. Lattanzi, Protecting Health Care Data: From Medical Secrecy to 
Personal Data Protection. Solution Found?, in THE PROTECTION OF MEDICAL 
DATA: CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY (2008).  
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the Health Secretary.23 The NIGB itself relies on the advice of 
its own Ethics and Confidentiality Committee (ECC) for 
guidance on § 251 applications from health care researchers.24 
This mechanism makes a mockery of patient consent for 
research as an important touchstone of the contrived notion of 
autonomy – in reality, patient self-determination (or 
“decisional privacy”) does not ultimately extend to true, 
accepted decision-making or informational privacy rights. 
 
 
Legal Architecture: A Constitutional Supra-rule for 
Privacy? 
 
It is difficult to determine a constitutional legal 
architecture, made up of supra-rules, rules and meta-rules, in 
the United Kingdom, but not impossible. 
 
To this author, rules are specific legal principles, and meta-
rules are procedural rules which determine how rules 
themselves are created. Supra-rules constrain or mandate 
which themes and rights created rules must express. 
Parliamentary sovereignty is the chief supra-rule in the UK – 
another is the rule of law itself.  
 
What the UK lacks is a constitutional “super rule,” or 
“supra-rule,” relating to privacy (or indeed, any other right). 
Although the HRA has been described as constitutional law it 
is not truly constitutional in nature, as it only requires the 
judiciary to take action on rights, and only then up to a point, 
however far, and as such is only a meta-rule – essentially a rule 
about rulemaking, rather than a rule within and above all 
rules.25 Parliamentary sovereignty might be said to be the only 
true supra-rule we have in the UK, depending on the definition 
that is accepted of the rule of law. 
 
W. J. Waluchow has analysed the organic process by which 
the Canadian courts interpret the Canadian constitution in the 
light of new laws, and vice versa. Waluchow notes that the  
  
                                                
23 National Health Service Act, supra note 20.  
24 See the website for the NIGB available at http://www.nigb.nhs.uk/. 
25 For example, § 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 outlines the ability of UK courts 
to make declarations to the effect that pieces of legislation are in their operation at 
odds with the rights outlined the 1998 Act itself, and yet these declarations do not 
suspend, repeal or amend the legislative provisions concerned 
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Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is found within the 
Canadian Constitution Act 1982 – the latter of which happens 
to describe itself, incidentally, as “the supreme law of 
Canada.”26 
 
A constitutional law on privacy would require elements of 
the meta-rule and supra-rule. A meta-rule is, to the author of 
this piece, a rule about rules, affecting the process of law-
making. A supra-rule, to this author, is a superior rule that 
affects the substantive intent and content within other rules. 
 
It is arguable that a combination of statutory supra-rules 
and meta-rules might operate to place limitations on the 
intrusion into privacy enjoyed by individuals from the political 
machinations of sovereignty or the State. For example, a kind 
of rationalised balancing exercise, such as a statute, that seeks 
to put a threshold on personal privacy values in electronic 
governance. 
 
The idea of a supra-rule with respect to personal privacy is 
that it is possible and indeed valuable to go beyond the 
“interpretive obligation” that Jack Beatson has described, § 
3(1) of the HRA having laid down, without resorting to what 
amounts to a written, everlasting and impermeable 
constitutional instrument.27 Such an instrument would, in 
turn, contravene the important “Simms principle” of 
Parliamentary sovereignty in the United Kingdom. 
 
The contemporary ideal of Parliamentary sovereignty still 
ensures that where the wording of an Act of Parliament strips 
away rights from an individual, or some closely defined group 
in society, our courts are bound to follow that expression of 
supposedly-democratic will from Parliament28. This Simms 
doctrine29, or Simms principle30, is the natural evolution of the 
Diceyan notion of the rule of law and Parliamentary 
                                                
26 WALUCHOW, supra note 13, at 1.  
27 See J. Beatson. Interpretive Obligations in Constitutional Tools, in 1 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING STATE (Perason, Harlow & Taggart eds, 
2008) (This ‘interpretive obligation’ placed on the courts by § 3(1) of the HRA is 
that the courts should give effect to ECHR rights “so far as it is possible to do so.”).  
28 See D.J. Machin, The Irrelevance of Democracy to the Public Justification of 
Political Authority, Res Publica (2009) 15:103-120 for a discussion of underpinning 
ideas here. 
29 As per Hoffman LJ in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p 
Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, at 131. 
30 As labelled by Lord Brown in A, K & M v. HM Treasury [2010] UKSC 2 at Para. 
198. 
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supremacy, from an age where there were few if any notions of 
persona legal rights outside of personal property, to a 
postmodern age of human rights. The core values of ultimate 
respect for Parliamentary legislative intention are still there. 
This will result sometimes in the swift reversal of positive steps 
the courts may actually take in the direction of the promotion 
of the universalisation of rights.31 
 
 
‘Foursquare’ Personal Privacy 
 
A great deal is written about personal privacy rights– and it 
is convention amongst proponents and detractors of personal 
privacy concepts, at least in the English-language body of 
literature on the subject, to cite to two famous papers, one by 
Warren & Brandeis, and the other by Prosser.32 
 
It is plain from a survey of the literature that the trend in 
research into issues of personal privacy has been to look at 
issues of “transactional” privacy rights as much as anything – 
where issues such as reputation, confidentiality, image, and 
trade secrets all have the air of industry about them.33 
Floridi has suggested a valid framework for informational 
privacy, but specifically from an ontological view.34 James H. 
Moor,35Herman T. Tavani,36 and Raymond Wacks37 have 
offered up other privacy frameworks. Recently, Nicole  
  
                                                
31 The decision ruling ‘asset-freezing’ orders unlawful in A, K & M v. HM Treasury 
[2010] UKSC 2 was swiftly followed by the Terrorist Asset-Freezing (Temporary 
Provisions) Act 2010, for example, legitimising the same orders once more.  
32Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.193 
(1890); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV.  383 (1960).  
33 See generally id. (Warren & Brandeis were concerned with a kind of reputational 
privacy in examining the early and tentative steps of a common law doctrine of 
confidentiality; while Prosser was concerned with outlining tortious actionable 
privacy rights that drew from the commercial viability of the person.).  
34 Luciano Floridi, Information, Ethics, Its Nature and Scope, 36 SIGCAS COMPUTERS 
& SOCIETY 3, (Sep. 2006); Luciano. Floridi. Informational, Privacy and Its 
Ontological Interpretation 36 SIGCAS COMPUTERS & SOCIETY 3, (Sept. 2006). 
35 James H. Moor, Towards a Theory of Privacy in the Information Age, COMPUTERS 
& SOCIETY, 27-32 (Sept. 1997).  
36 Herman T. Tavani, & James H. Moor, Privacy Protection, Control of Information, 
and Privacy-Enhancing Technologies, COMPUTERS & SOCIETY, at 6-11 (Mar. 2001). 
37 See generally Raymond Wacks, The Protection of Privacy, in MODERN LEGAL 
STUDIES (J.B.W.B. McAuslan, W.R. Cornish, T.C. Daintith, R.P. Grime, J.D. 
McClean, & C. Palley eds., 1980); RAYMOND WACKS, PERSONAL INFORMATION: 
PRIVACY AND THE LAW (1989). 
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Moreham has done sterling work in outlining what privacy 
effectively means with regard to our individual selves, both in 
the common law38 and in European human rights 
jurisprudence.39 
Additionally, other authors on privacy have outlined 
notions of personal rights that account, in addition, for bodily 
privacy, spatial privacy, and decisional privacy.40 Beate Rössler 
discusses “three dimensions of privacy” in her work The Value 
of Privacy, outlining “decisional privacy,” “informational 
privacy,” and “local privacy.”41 Kendall Thomas outlines 
another three dimensional privacy concept: “bodily privacy,” 
“spatial privacy,” and, like Rössler, “decisional privacy.”42 We 
can equate Rössler’s “local privacy” to both of Thomas’ 
“spatial” and “bodily” privacy aspects, while Raymond Wacks 
has written extensively on “informational privacy,” as have 
many others.43 
 
Even this extremely brief survey leaves us with a workable 
“dimension” model that is: (a) based on action (the 
preservation or use of self-determination under the law); and 
(b) split into four component parts that are contemporaneously 
linked: decisional privacy, bodily privacy, spatial privacy, and 
informational privacy. This is a privacy typology devised by the 
author of this piece. 
So, we must turn to why these four key terms represent 
important ideas, why it is useful to address them, and indeed, 
conceive of them in a certain order, namely: (i) bodily, (ii) 
spatial, (iii) decisional and (iv) informational privacy. This 
                                                
38 Nicole Moreham Privacy in English Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical 
Analysis, 121 L.Q. R. 628 (2005). 
39 Nicole Moreham, The Right to Respect for Private Life in the European 
Convention on Human Rights: A Re-examination, 1 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 44-79 
(2008).  
40 See Jeffery L. Johnson, A Theory of the Nature and Value of Privacy, PUBLIC 
AFFAIRS QUARTERLY, Vol 6, No. 3, 271-88 (1992); Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil 
Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61 (2009); Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy As Contextual 
Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 120 (2004); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 737, 784-85(1989); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. 
REV. 101 (2008); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR 
AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET (2007) Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 
U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006); and Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 1431 (1992). 
41 See generally BEATE RÖSSLER, THE VALUE OF PRIVACY, (ed., 2005). 
42 See generally Thomas & Walport, supra note 14, at 31.  
43 See generally Wacks, supra note 37.  
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model of personal privacy might be termed ‘foursquare’ 
privacy. 
It is easiest to think of bodily privacy as the inner shell in a 
layered structure of personal privacy, or rather, layered 
multiple personal privacies. Bodily privacy is for the author of 
this piece dependent on the idea of personal bodily sanctity 
and the integrity of the person as a vehicle for a rational actor.  
Spatial privacy is the next layer of personal privacy in our 
layered privacy concept – of course it is to be acknowledged 
that spatial privacy is something that changes dependant on 
whether an individual is in a public or private space at any one 
particular time. Spatial privacy is a flexible and elastic concept 
that varies across the multitude of human cultures.  
Decisional privacy is not to be confused with autonomy – it 
is submitted here that true personal autonomy cannot exist 
except in philosophical schools of thought. As lawyers, we must 
accept some control of legal systems over personal action 
taking and decision-making; voluntariness or involuntariness 
here is an irrelevance. If personal autonomy is about the non-
existent ideal of self-governance; decisional privacy reflects for 
every person the concept of having legitimate choices to choose 
between regarding their own actions. Decisional privacy can be 
likened to a sense off-limited “self-determination” in this 
sense. 
Informational privacy is the notion of a personal link for 
every individual between the information that describes that 
person’s identity and their own decisional privacy. The nature 
of this link, and thus the extent of every individual’s personal 
decisional privacy, is controlled by interventions and initiatives 
from the panoply of electronic governance administered by 
public authorities. 
 
Finding privacy principles in the literature 
Pieces of legislation across the globe --and in the UK too, of 
course--outline concepts of privacy. Some of them even touch 
upon or address directly issues of informational privacy; such 
as the Data Protection Act 1998 in the UK.  
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Examples of existing privacy principles in the literature (as 
opposed to legal instruments) include the set of principles or 
values put forward by Goodenough.44 
 Goodenough’s ‘Restatement of the Right of Identity’ asserts 
that “[e]very real person has a limited right to control the use 
and value of the attributes of his or her personality and 
identity.”45 The crux of any such principle is the deployment of 
the word “limited.” Governments, in restricting and (lawfully 
or unlawfully) infringing our rights or civil liberties, are 
limiting their scope and use. 
The legalities of personal privacy in the public domain 
when it comes to reputation and confidentiality have been the 
subject of disputes and emerging trends in the courts; but 
recounting this jurisprudential progress is not the purpose of 
this literature review, even though literature abounds on the 
subject in relation to the law in the UK.46 
 
Identity management and privacy are intrinsically linked.47 
As our concepts of personal identity are changing so to must 
our concepts of personal privacy, in particular informational 
privacy, as well as our notions of the value of the same.48 At the 
same time, an information society with transformative, 
multiple, electronic personal identities for individuals 
necessitates a new politics, and not a liberal conservative new 
politics,49 but a new platform of political technologies entirely, 
and a platform upon which our typical concepts of a social 
contract and communitarian philosophies may be tested.50 
                                                
44 See generally Oliver R. Goodenough, Retheorising Privacy and Publicity, 1 
I.P.Q. 37-70 (1997) (In this piece, Goodenough reviews the evolution of US 
privacy and publicity rights, with an eye to UK law at that time.). 
45 Id. at 63. 
46 See Craig Callery, John Terry: Reflections on Public Image, Sponsorship and 
Employment,2 INT’L SPORTS L. REV.,48-52 (2010).  
47See John Harrison & Pete Bramall, New Approaches to Identity Management and 
Privacy: A Guide Prepared for the Information Commissioner, INFORMATION 
COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE (Dec. 2007), available at 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_g
uides/edentity_hp_idm_paper_for_web.pdf. 
48 See generally IAN KERR, VALERIA STEEVES & CAROLE LUCOCK, LESSONS FROM THE 
IDENTITY TRAIL: ANONYMITY, PRIVACY AND IDENTITY IN A NETWORKED SOCIETY 
(2009). 
49 The United Kingdom currently has a nominally centrist coalition Government 
comprised of the Liberal Democrat and Conservative parties.  
50 Rolf H. Weber, & Romana Weber, Social Contract for the Internet Community?: 
Historical and Philosophical Theories as Basis for the Inclusion of Civil Society in 
Internet Governance? SCRIPTED 6(1) (Apr. 2009), available at 
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol6-1/weber.asp).  
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Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the Analysis by Nicole Moreham 
 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights is 
enforceable horizontally and vertically in the United Kingdom 
(that is to say, between two private legal persons, as well as 
between an individual and the state in judicial review 
mechanisms) through the effect of the Human Rights Act 
1998.51 Individuals can assert that their “right to ... [a] private 
and family life” has been unlawfully infringed because it cannot 
be shown that the infringement of their right in this regard was 
legitimate given the law relevant to the exact infringement, or 
proportional to the aims of the organisation responsible for the 
infringement, or necessary as an infringement of this right, in a 
democratic society.52 
 
Article 8 reads: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private 
and family life, his home and his correspondence. 
 
2. There shall be no interference by a public 
authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security, public safety or the economic 
well-being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.53 
 
Nicole Moreham has analysed how this qualified right has 
been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg. Looking at Moreham’s work, it is possible to see 
that she has identified around 22 distinct facets to Article 8 
case law based on the expression by claimants through their 
assertion of their Article 8 right.54 Each of these facets fall 
clearly into particular elements of our ‘foursquare’ notion of 
personal privacy. 
 
                                                
51 Human Rights Act 1998, § 1, art. 8, c. 42 (U.K.). 
52 Id. at sch. 1.  
53 Id.  
54 N. Moreham, 1 EUR. HUM. RTS.  L. REV. , 44-79 (2008).     
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The facets of Article 8 we can extract from Moreham’s work 
(22 of 24 of which are concerned with a ‘private life’) are as 
follows, and are amended from Moreham’s analysis: 
 
1. Physical assault and exposure 
2. Search 
3. Surveillance 
4. Unwanted listening 
5. Unwanted watching 
6. Disseminating images 
7. Collecting information 
8. Storing information 
9. Publishing information 
10. Information about one’s parent’s and family development 
11. Recognition of gender 
12. Right to retain one’s own name 
13. Cultural identity/ Right to live as a gypsy 
14. Sexual activities 
15. Euthanasia 
16. Homosexual activities 
17. Access to medical procedures/ Forced medical procedures 
18. Sadomasochism 
19. Providing information about health risks 
20. The right to maintain and to end familial and other 
relationships 
21. The right to begin or to end pregnancy 
22. The right to control and know about health and medical 
interventions 
23. Protection of family life/ Development of relationships 
24. Protection of personal correspondence 
 
But while Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights offers up a broadly applicable right to a private life, as 
these facets shown by Moreham identify readily, Article 8 is 
constrained in that application by the vagaries of judicial 
narrative. UK courts must follow, by their own reasoning, the 
principle of comity – that is, respecting the decisions of UK 
public authorities wherever possible, given that the powers of 
UK public authorities tend to stem from statute, and carry the 
weight of parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
This author would call this a set or fixed legal narrative, and 
failed claims in the UK judicial review system that are based 
upon an alleged unlawful infringement of Article 8 are failed 
fixed legal narratives of a sort. This author would offer up as 
evidence the kind of factual distinction that occurs between the 
case of R (On the application of L) v Commissioner of the 
Police of the Metropolis and the case of R (A) v B [2010] 
EWHC 2361. 
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In the former, the alleged unlawful sharing of sensitive 
personal information had occurred prior to the claim by L 
being made. In the latter case, A was able to make a claim for 
judicial review before the disclosure of his sensitive personal 
information, and won a declaration, as a kind of remedy, that 
any such disclosure would be unlawful.  
 
The similarity of the facts of the two cases, thematically 
speaking, are both centred around what this author would call 
the criminalisation of innocence rather than strict guilt, and 
the notion of both personal privacy and of a fair trial. But the 
similarities of the facts end in relation to narrative; in L, comity 
is respected since the actions of information sharing, though 
they infringe privacy rights for L, are ratified by the UK 
Supreme Court in retrospect; but as the European Court of 
Human Rights has shown in case like S & Marper v UK, the 
Strasbourg court itself is no great respecter of comity between 
the UK courts and UK public policy.  
 
In R (A) v B, comity is not an issue – the claim by A comes 
at a point in the narrative, before A’s privacy rights are actually 
infringed, and so the High Court in that case has carte blanche 
to intervene with a declaration, an uncontroversial remedy of 
sorts. 
 
What this author would suggest for reform, and tries to 
outline theoretically here in this article, is a constitutionalised 
protection of privacy rights from a damaging, fixed common-
law legal narrative based on action, the intervention of comity 
and the unsuitability of retrospective remedies for human 
rights infringements.  
 
 
Parliamentary Sovereignty as the Foundation of a 
Legal Architecture 
 
Parliament in the United Kingdom can strip human rights 
away from individuals through the creation of clear and 
unambiguous legislative provisions. This variant of 
Parliamentary sovereignty is something that Costas Douzinas 
has described as a fetish,55 but I feel it is something that can be 
harnessed to divert a narrative of intrusions into personal 
privacy by the State. We must distinguish between the 
                                                
55 See Costas Douzinas, Athens Revolting: Three Meditations on Sovereignty and 
One On Its (Possible) Dismantlement, LAW CRITIQUE (Jul. 24, 2010), available at 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/qm4v850847223014/fulltext.pdf. 
Vol. 4, Issue 1 
 
50 
 
pureness of Parliament and the Machiavellian ethos of the 
State. Žižek has noted that this separation occurs in many 
widespread political philosophies, including Chinese 
Legalism.56 Parliamentary sovereignty in contemporary Britain  
is something that accords with what Costas Douzinas has 
written about. Douzinas refers to an amalgam of ‘violence/law’ 
as encompassing intrusion into rights (including privacy), as is 
explored below.    
 
Lord Hoffmann in R v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (Ex parte Simms) said: 
 
Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament 
can, if it chooses, legislate contrary to 
fundamental principles of human rights. The 
Human Rights Act 1998 will not detract from this 
power. The constraints upon its exercise by 
Parliament are ultimately political, not legal. But 
the principle of legality means that Parliament 
must squarely confront what it is doing and 
accept the political cost. Fundamental rights 
cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous 
words. This is because there is too great a risk 
that the full implications of their unqualified 
meaning may have passed unnoticed in the 
democratic process. In the absence of express 
language or necessary implication to the 
contrary, the courts therefore presume that even 
the most general words were intended to be 
subject to the basic rights of the individual. In 
this way the courts of the United Kingdom, 
though acknowledging the sovereignty of 
Parliament, apply principles of constitutionality 
little different from those which exist in countries 
where the power of the legislature is expressly 
limited by a constitutional document. 57 
 
Subsequently, in HMAHM Treasury v. Ahmed and Others, 
Lord Brown deemed this the “Simms principle.”58 
 
                                                
56 SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, LIVING IN THE END TIMES 11-15 (2010). 
57R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, (2000) 2 A.C. 115 (H.L.) at 
131.  
58 HM Treasury v. Ahmed and Others, [2010 UKSC 2 ¶ 193].  
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The failings of the UK approach in enforcing privacy are 
concerned with a lack of normative consistency in privacy-
related UK jurisprudence, since the remedies method59 
depends on not only a successful action by a complainant, but 
also on an individual’s ability to initiate that action with some 
chance of success, or initiate an action at all. 
 
For example, when enforcing the right to a private or family 
life in the UK, courts depend upon the status of an individual 
as a “victim”60 – but this is not possible when that individual is 
a victim of infringement, where the victim’s rights are related 
to overriding “political questions.”61 Ultimately, this barrier for 
victims is Parliamentary sovereignty rearing its noble head 
once more.62 
 
 
Informational Privacy, E-governance,  
and S & Marper v. UK 
 
Roberto Lattanzi articulates actions to restore or protect 
individual informational privacy as following a principle of 
habeas data, as opposed to habeas corpus.63 The European 
Court of Human Rights (Eur. Ct. H. R.) Article 8 case of S & 
Marper v. UK,64 is possibly a guide for the increasing future 
recognition of informational privacy. The outcome of this case 
shows that jurisprudential inroads into governance in the 
name of privacy are possible even without a fully-developed 
concept of governance-model privacy in place. 
 
                                                
59 See Normann Witzleb Justifying Gain-Based Remedies for Invasions of Privacy 
29(2) O.J..L.S. STUD 325 (2009) (exploring the “remedies” method as one where 
breach of confidence is relied upon against the wrongful publication of private 
information). 
60Human Rights Act 1998, supra note 51. 
61 Paul Daly, Justiciablity and the “Political Question” Doctrine’, PUB. L. 160-
178, (Jan. 2010). 
62 See Richard Buxton, Private Life and the English Judges, 29 J. OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 413 (2009) (pointing out that many of the inconsistencies in judgments of 
this sort are due to the personalities of the judges as well as their views of social 
priorities).  
63 See generally Roberto Lattanzi Garante, Protecting Health Care Data: From 
Medical  to Personal Data Protection. Solution Found?, a chapter from Jean 
Herveg, The Protection of Medical Data: Challenges of the 21stCcentury, 
(Anthmis, ed., 1st ed. 2008).  
64 S & Marper v. United Kingdom, [2007] ECHR 110; See generally Kate Beattie, 
S and Marper v. UK: Privacy DNAUK: Privacy DNA and Crime Prevention, 1 
EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 229 (2009) (for an excellent overview of the issues in the 
case).  
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What the author of this piece suggests is that the UK 
currently lacks what Rössler identifies as “the sorts of 
democratically delegated, state control[s] that people (must be 
able to) rely upon for the protection of their informational 
privacy.”65 S & Marper is an example of how personal privacy 
issues can affect potentially millions of individual citizens 
through the operation of flawed, illegitimate e-governance 
systems. These issues will continue to effect personal privacy 
rights despite supposed ameliatory legal reforms through the 
operation of a national criminal DNA database in the Crime 
and Security Act of 2010.66 
 
 
Legal Narratology 
 
Posner67 coined the term “legal narratology” and defined it 
as the study of legal narratives using literary and critical 
theories.68 He noted that “Judicial opinions usually have a 
story element, the narration of the facts of the case that opens 
most opinions. “Some judges try to cast the whole opinion as 
the story of the parties’ dispute, using chronology rather than a 
logical or analytical structure to organize the opinion...”69 
 
I would like to proffer two examples here of Posner’s 
meaning. First, Lord Justice Ward in Morgue begins with a 
narrative that is couched in an almost mythic style:  
 
This is a case about bats and badgers, Beeching and 
bus-ways. In 1969 Lord Beeching caused the closure 
of the 128 year old railway line between Fareham 
and Gosport in Hampshire. Since then it has become 
overgrown with trees, shrubs and other vegetation. 
Bats and badgers have moved in. Now Hampshire 
County Council has granted Transport for South 
Hampshire planning permission for a bus route 
along the old track. A local resident, Mrs Vivienne 
Morge, challenges that permission asserting that it 
will disturb the bats and badgers and have a serious 
adverse impact on the environment. His Honour 
                                                
65 Rossler, supra note 14, at 118.  
66 Crime and Security Act 2010, c. 17, §23 (U.K.).   
67 Richard A. Posner is currently a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit and the author of over 40 books on jurisprudence, legal 
philosophy, and other topics. 
68 Richard A. Posner, Legal Narratology, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 737 (1997). 
69 Id. at 739. 
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Judge Bidder Q.C., sitting as a Deputy High Court 
Judge of the Queen's Bench Division, dismissed her 
claim for judicial review but Sullivan L.J. has given 
her permission to appeal.70 
  
Ward LJ’s tone here is slightly mocking, in an 
acknowledgement that this may not be a fascinating tale for 
those actors outside the conduct of the narrative, or case itself. 
But these scene-setting, mythic narratives from the judiciary 
can herald much more dramatic cases. Second, and well-
known to some, is the passage by Lord Denning71 in Hinz,72 
where he added drama to a sad incident that merited it: 
 
It happened on April 19, 1964. It was bluebell time 
in Kent. Mr. and Mrs. Hinz had been married some 
10 years, and they had four children, all aged nine 
and under. The youngest was one. Mrs. Hinz was a 
remarkable woman. In addition to her own four, she 
was foster-mother to four other children. To add to 
it, she was two months pregnant with her fifth child. 
 
… On this day they drove out in a Bedford 
Dormobile van from Tonbridge to Canvey Island. 
They took all eight children with them. As they were 
coming back they turned into a lay-by at Thurnham 
to have a picnic tea. The husband, Mr. Hinz, was at 
the back of the Dormobile making the tea. Mrs. Hinz 
had taken Stephanie, her third child, aged three, 
across the road to pick bluebells on the opposite 
side. There came along a Jaguar car driven by Mr. 
Berry, out of control. A tyre had burst. The Jaguar 
rushed into this lay-by and crashed into Mr. Hinz 
and the children. Mr. Hinz was frightfully injured 
and died a little later. Nearly all the children were 
hurt. Blood was streaming from their heads. Mrs. 
Hinz, hearing the crash, turned round and saw this 
disaster. She ran across the road and did all she 
could. Her husband was beyond recall. But the 
children recovered.73 
 
                                                
70 Morge v. Hampshire County Council, [2010] EWCA Civ 608.  
71 Thanks go to my colleague Chris Poole for alerting me to the narrative from 
Denning in this case. 
72 Hinz v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40. (UK).  
73 Id. at 42. 
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These legal narratives, as cases, need not end well for either 
claimant or defendant. Indeed, the adversarial nature of 
English common law ensures that there must be a winner and 
a loser in each narrative. It is easy to see how these mythic case 
narratives thus arise. Problems for our legal conscience 
necessarily arise when we observe the inequalities in the 
narratives that deal with the cases of individuals as claimants 
against the State, perhaps as judicial review cases in our body 
of common law. Political values will appear to trump the rights 
asserted by individuals (particularly in cases concerning 
privacy and other civil liberties) as the meta-narrative of law as 
sovereignty asserts itself in supremacy. The impossible task of 
combining legality with human rights is an attempt to assert a 
supra-narrative, and create a different story. The difficulties of 
this can be seen in the way Costas Douzinas outlines the 
relationship between State power and law, and either 
democracy, or resistance.74 
 
 
Privacy as Resistance to Intrusion given Law as 
Violence 
 
In his book Human Rights and Empire, Costas Douzinas 
formulated seven “theses on the relationship between violence 
and normativity” that result in a concept of the “amalgam of 
violence/law.”75 
 
These read: 
 
1. The conflict between violence and law is more 
apparent than real. It should be replaced with an 
examination of the amalgam violence/law, in 
which violence is placed at the service of law and 
creates law while law both uses and begets 
violence. 
 
2. State violence protects dominant interests and 
the established balance of power, but it is always 
exercised in the name of ideal ends (even if highly 
abstract and general such as God, Nation, Law, 
Peace or Humanity). The violence sustaining the 
structure of domination is that of means towards 
high ends. This is the ideological process par 
excellence. 
                                                
74 See COSTAS DOUZINAS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EMPIRE (2007).  
75 Id. at 268.  
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3. All force leads to counter-force, all violence to 
counter-violence, all systems of domination 
create resistances. 
 
4. The job of ideology is to turn the violence of the 
dominant powers into an exercise of legitimate 
force and to present all resisting counter-force as 
violence, criminality, brutality. In the dialectic 
between violence and counter-violence, state 
action reverses the causal and chronological 
sequence and presents itself as countering or pre-
empting an original (social, political) violence. 
Social or political violence is evil, it pre-dates and 
leads to the creation of state counter-violence in 
response. 
 
5. The principle of state violence is pre-emptive 
action against evil violence in the service of 
higher normative ends. 
 
6. Systems of domination are supported by an 
organisation of violence, which coerces, 
criminalises and disposes of those who resist it or 
are surplus to its requirements. State or 
‘objective’ violence normatively justified triggers 
extreme forms of ‘subjective’ violence, which 
idealises hatred and attempts to cleanse self and 
society from all evidence of otherness . . .  
 
7. The invocation of morality serves the 
perpetuation of systems of domination. 
 
 As long as there is domination, as long as 
violence is used to defend it, there will be 
resistance and counter-violence, Moralising, 
criminalising or outlawing counter-violence 
freezes the current balance of power and awards 
perpetual (moral as well as material) supremacy 
to the dominant forces.76 
 
These seven theses can be adapted into an ‘amalgam’ of 
‘intrusion/law’ when it comes to examining the mechanisms of 
intrusion by the State into aspects of personal ‘foursquare’ 
                                                
76 Id.   
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privacy. The State controls the array of decisions available to 
individuals who assert those decisions, and can increase the 
array of private decisions available to them only through 
successful narratives of resistance. 
 
Narratives of resistance, or legal claims that can triumph 
against comity, public policy considerations and political 
questions, require a system of legal architectures, as this 
author has already noted here, that would give 
“constitutionalised protection of privacy rights from a 
damaging, fixed common-law legal narrative based on action, 
the intervention of comity and the unsuitability of retrospective 
remedies for human rights infringements.” 
 
The work of William B. Yeats shows dramatic narrative 
parallels with that of Costas Douzinas in Human Rights and 
Empire. We can examine themes of resistance and decision in 
three short overviews of some of Yeats’s most well-known 
pieces of work. I do not claim to be a Yeats scholar, but some 
conclusions about his work make themselves readily apparent.  
 
One idea that leaps out from these two pieces of writing are 
that constitutionality and resistance are mutually dependent, 
in that with well-protected constitutional rights, individuals 
have little need for resistance, because the actions of 
government are constrained within fixed formalised limits 
based on constitutional supra-rules. What Yeats can be seen to 
do is highlight in his work the  necessity of protection the 
individual actor from the machinations and cruelties of an 
unbound State, as well as protect him from the entropy of a 
politic in lethargy. 
 
 
Yeats’ Poetry; and Decisional Privacy as Humility 
 
W.B. Yeats wrote the poem He Wishes For The Cloths Of 
Heaven, in what appears perhaps to be the most bittersweet 
counterpoint to some of his more strident writing—it is a poem 
about trust, longing, and humility; and perhaps about love.77 
The lines of the poem read: 
 
                                                
77 WILLIAM B. YEATS, He Wishes for the Cloths of Heaven, in THE VARIORUM 
EDITION OF THE COLLECTED POEMS OF W.B. YEATS, 176 (Allt & Alspach, eds., 
Macmillan: London, 2d ed, 1978) (1968).  
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Had I the heavens’ embroidered cloths, 
Enwrought with golden and silver light, 
The blue and the dim and the dark cloths 
Of night and light and the half-light, 
I would spread the cloths under your feet: 
But I, being poor, have only my dreams; 
I have spread my dreams under your feet; 
Tread softly because you tread on my dreams.78 
 
In more contemporary popular culture, this poem is 
referenced in the dialogue between two characters in the film 
Equilibrium.79 Sean Bean’s character, Errol Partridge, is a 
renegade law enforcer who quotes the lines to Christian Bale’s 
character, John Preston. Preston shoots Partridge dead in an 
act of oppression—despite the humility and surrender offered 
in the above quoted lines by Yeats. 
 
The two characters in the scene are superficially good 
friends and colleagues fulfilling a role of oppression and 
violence in a society where emotions, and all cultural 
expressions of emotions, have become repressed through force, 
and force of habit. The character Partridge is an active member 
of what passes for a resistance organisation because he is 
motivated to take action by the repressive excesses of those in 
power. People in this society are required, through the threat of 
force, to take drugs to blunt their emotional response to 
cultural stimuli. In the film, we see Leonardo Da Vinci’s Mona 
Lisa being burnt because it throws up too many challenging 
emotions as are cognisable work of art from a previous, 
emotionally-imbued time.  
 
With regard to the (lawful) killing of individuals by the 
State who dare to collect and enjoy cultural material, the lethal 
violence employed by law enforcers in this society has passed 
beyond the point of being arbitrary and has become oppressive 
but also a raison d’être80 for the State.  
 
But just as Douzinas postulates that resistance must be 
created by violence (and presumably intrusions into privacy), 
perpetrated and condoned by the State, so we can see in a 
particular work by Yeats that when humility and passive  
                                                
78 Id.  
79 EQUILIBRIUM (Miramax Films 2002). 
80 French term meaning: reason for existence.  
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decisional privacies are exhausted, individuals living under the 
sovereignty of the State will take up violence or resistance (and 
perhaps legal action as resistance) to broaden and reinforce 
their decisional privacy once more. 
 
 
Yeats’ Drama; and Decisional Privacy as Resistance 
 
Yeats could be said, through his poetry, to regard the law as 
a poor instrument in its naivety, noting the vulnerability of the 
legal system and the course of (even nationalist) staid politics 
to the certainty of expressive and forceful (nationalist) political 
action and protest. In his poem Nineteen Hundred And 
Nineteen he wrote: 
 
[W]e too had many pretty toys when young: 
A law indifferent to blame or praise, 
To bribe or threat; habits that made old wrong 
Melt down, as it were wax in the sun’s rays; 
Public opinion ripening for so long 
We thought it would outlive all future days 
O what fine thought we had because we thought 
That the worst rogues and rascals had died out.81 
 
Whilst much of Yeats’ poetry shows wistful regard for 
emotions of love, nostalgia and peace, a famous piece of 
literary drama he co-wrote is an emblem of violent resistance 
and Irish nationalism. Moving, but forcefully so, the short play 
Cathleen Ni Houlihan (1902)82 asks us to empathise with the 
morals and aspirations of a resistance fighter and the 
oppressed in a country perceived to be lacking in national(ist) 
“self-determination”. 
 
Cathleen Ni Houlihan, the ‘Old Woman’ in the play, is the 
embodiment of Ireland itself, or rather, Irish nationalist 
longing for freedom from oppression—oppression caused by 
the British ‘strangers in the house’ that is Ireland.83 The Old 
Woman tells us that “sometimes [her] feet are tired and [her] 
hands are quiet, but there is no quiet in [her] heart.”84 The play 
                                                
81 W.B. YEATS, Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen, THE VARIORUM EDITION OF THE 
POEMS OF W.B. YEATS 428 (Allt & Alspach, eds., Macmillan 1968) in COLLECTED 
POEMS OF W.B. YEATS, 233 (Macmillan: London, 2d ed 1978) (1968). 
82 See http://cathleen-ni-houlihan.blogspot.com/ PLAYS OF W.B. YEATS 49-57 
(Macmillan Co. 1953).  
83 Id. at 53. 
84 Id.   
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displays notions of agrarian-linked nationalism, as the Old 
Woman talks of land that was taken from her, and the little or 
nothing that has been done by supposed ‘friends’ of hers to 
return it to her.85 The Old Woman says: “If anyone would give 
me help, he must give me himself, he must give me all.”86 The 
Old Woman declares that her ‘friends’ are not to be frustrated 
in their longer resistance: “If they are put down to-day, they 
will get the upper hand to-morrow.”87 
 
By the end of the short play, after the Old Woman has 
convinced a young man to take up resistance on her behalf, we 
are told that she has been transformed from an Old Woman 
into a ‘young girl’ who has “the walk of a queen.”88 In a link 
with critical theory, Žižek has noted that citizenry will exclaim 
as their sovereign in person passes them, since before them 
and their very eyes their ‘state is walking’89 – the end of 
Cathleen Ni Houlihan shows us that nationalists and those 
resisting sovereign power may just be searching out one 
sovereign to put in place of another, thus dooming their 
narrative action.90 
 
 
Legal Architecture: avoiding the need for resistance 
and asserting ‘foursquare’ notions of privacy 
 
This author wishes to place an emphasis on constructing 
legal architecture in building edifices of privacy rights rather 
than exposing claimants in privacy cases to the overwhelming 
narrative of the sovereign political interest is needed.  
 
In some way this author is remaining with the notion that 
we could construct an edifice of supra- and meta-rules that give 
“constitutionalised protection of privacy rights from a 
damaging, fixed common-law legal narrative based on action, 
the intervention of comity and the unsuitability of retrospective 
remedies for human rights infringements”, as outlined above. 
 
                                                
85 Id. at 53-55. 
86 Id. at 55. 
87 Id.  
88 Id. at 57.  
89 SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, IN DEFENSE OF LOST CAUSES, 133 (2008).  
90 See http://cathleen-ni-houlihan.blogspot.com/ (for a reference in a play about  the 
French coming to Ireland as the replacement of sovereigns). 
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Our first step in outlining how this edifice might be 
constructed is to accept that sovereignty is not often, or rarely 
cross-cultural—State sovereignty often recoils in its exercise of 
power as law from the notion of the spread of ideas. This leads 
to the conclusion that we must draw on cross-cultural notions 
of privacy in constructing an architectural epistemology of 
privacy laws. 
 
Different societies have different concepts of privacy needs 
and values. This is evidenced in different physical architectural 
styles when it comes to building and construction. It has been 
suggested here that physical architectural models can be used 
to inspire legislative architectural models. This author would 
like to put forward a particular original thesis: the traditional 
architecture of the Arabic Mashrabiyya or Indian Jali can be 
seen as a model for potential universal privacy legislation that 
the UK is currently lacking—providing the substantive 
instrumental content for a move toward ‘constitutional privacy’ 
for better rights-observant electronic governance, for example, 
in health, social care and criminal justice.  
 
As for the mashrabiyya or jali: these items of architecture 
are screenwalls that are robust yet porous to the light and wind 
passing through spaces. In such a way, constitutional privacy 
protection based on a screenwall type model would afford 
inviolable rights protected by constitutional supra-rules with 
respect to aspects of (informational) privacy, in this context. 
 
It is suggested here that a “Mashrabiyyaa model” or a 
fully-developed Jali-Mashrabiyya-Temenos  Model (“JMT 
Model”) of constitutional privacy might help the courts and 
legislators better understand and build upon the multi-faceted 
complicity of Article 8 ECHR and the “right to a private and 
family life.”91 In the words of Moreham, Article 8 ECHR strives 
to address “freedom from interference with physical and 
psychological integrity”, “the collection and disclosure of 
information”, the “protection of one’s living environment”, and 
personal “identity”, as well as a concept of “autonomy”  (which 
I would supplant with the notion of “decisional privacy”).92 
 
 
                                                
91 See Moreham, supra note 39  
92 Id. at 44, 49. 
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The Jali-Mashrabiyya-Temenos Model (JMT) of 
Architectural Cultural Privacy Law 
 
The enforcement of privacy rights, or the protection of 
privacy “sanctities” is what Charles Fried calls the “concrete 
recognition of privacy.”93 
 
It will take a shift away from action-based, or will-based 
models of privacy to truly achieve this “concrete recognition”, 
since these models of privacy are vulnerable to the fixed 
narratives of comity and retrospective public policy 
considerations as discussed above.  
 
This means we must try and disrupt or divert the narrative 
of intrusions into privacy by the State by building an 
architectural legal edifice of sorts that is capable of 
appropriately protecting personal privacy, as defined by our 
broad “foursquare” notion of that politically-limited ideal. 
Constitutional privacy, or governance-model privacy, looks at 
the notion of privacy protection as operating a “screenwall” 
between the individuals and intrusive aspects of the 
governance of the State. 
 
In Arabic and Indian physical rather than legislative 
architecture; 
 
such screenwalls include the Indian jali or the 
Arabic [mashrabiyya]. A jali is a perforated stone 
screen, while a mashrabiyya is a projecting bay 
window articulated by wood latticework. Visual 
connection from the interior to the exterior is 
provided, while visual penetration from the exterior 
to the interior is prevented, offering privacy to 
inhabitants. Such screens enable ventilation, 
provide shading and modulate the luminous 
environment of the interior.94 
 
                                                
93 CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND 
SOCIAL CHOICE 144 (Harvard University Press 1970).  
94 Michael Hensel, Performance-Oriented Design Precursors and Potentials, 78 
ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN 2, 48, 50 (2008). 
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A Mashrabiyya model of constitutional privacy would see a 
better protection of the individual’s privacy from the State by 
virtue of enhancing not the right of an individual to move, 
think, and live unimpeded—autonomy—but the right not to be 
personally transgressed upon by the State itself. The 
Mashrabiyya sees greater respect for the personal “interior” 
but still allows for participation of the individual through sight 
of the “exterior.” State agencies and functions can be invited to 
transgress inside the “interior” through individual consent, but 
can do so without consent only with greater difficulty, and 
respect for the risk of harm that might befall the individual 
“inside.” We cannot be blind to the value of cross-cultural 
models of privacy rights if only because privacy has such cross-
cultural value. 
 
The ancient Greek temenos was a cleared, open and sacred 
space, reserved for private religious activities, and yet also a 
meeting place for citizens on a temple acropolis.95  
 
We can suggest that the concepts of the Jali, the 
Mashrabiyya and the temenos lend us the characteristics of 
the ‘hard-porous’ Jali protection of privacy, the soft-porous 
protection of privacy by the Mashrabiyya, and the ‘open but 
sensitive’ categorisation of certain aspects of the relationship 
between personal privacy and the sovereign State. (See Fig. 1) 
 
                                                
95 See generally BIRGITTA BERGQUIST, THE ARCHAIC GREEK TEMENOS: A STUDY 
OF STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION (1967). 
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Fig. 1 
 
The “JMT ” model of privacy protection (from State 
intrusions) gives us three levels of protection that afford a 
“core” protection from that intrusion and a “sanctity” of 
decisional privacies of the utmost importance.  
 
Jali-protected decisional privacy might include the right to 
speak in one’s own defence in an aspect of a fair trial, for 
example, which would not be limited in any circumstances. 
Jali-protected informational privacy rights would never be 
qualified or limited, in law, in political constitution or in 
operation. An example of a core jali-protected, 
constitutionalised and unqualified privacy right, drawn from 
the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic revised most 
recently in 2005, might be, “Article 35(5): The allocation of a 
single national number to any citizen shall be prohibited.”96 
 
                                                
96 See CONST. OF THE PORT. REP., art.35(5) (7th Rev.,2005), available at 
http://app.parlamento.pt/site_antigo/ingles/cons_leg/Constitution_VII_revisao_defi
nitive.pdf. 
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Mashrabiyya-protected decisional privacy might protect, in 
turn, freedom of religion (limited by the caveat that the 
promotion of religious intolerance is intolerable). In relation to 
informational privacy, and to give an example from the same 
source as above, a qualified right to the protection of sensitive 
personal information of various kinds in the Portuguese 
Constitution runs: 
 
Article 35(3): Computers shall not be used to treat 
data concerning philosophical or political 
convictions, party or trade union affiliations, 
religious beliefs, private life or ethnic origins, save 
with the express consent of the data subject, with 
authorisation provided for by law and with 
guarantees of non-discrimination, or for the purpose 
of processing statistical data that cannot be 
individually identified.97 
 
Temenos-protected decisional privacies would include the 
full array of socio-economic rights and decisions relevant to 
education, social welfare, and healthcare, that are susceptible 
to shifting political policy, and which are not as central to the 
ultimate protection of our core decisional privacies. They might 
not be politically sensitive enough, or central enough to human 
rights concepts founded on dignity to warrant full and express 
constitutional protection in our “JMT Model” edifice of privacy 
rights, and instead could be protected where appropriate 
through a balancing exercise undertaken by the courts, as they 
do with all privacy rights in the UK today.  
 
The mechanisms of protection within a legislative supra-
rule or single legal instrument in the form of an Act of 
Parliament in the UK would harness the highest constitutional 
principles of the legal system concerned with the notion in the 
UK that State sovereignty, through the Simms principle, would 
ensure that in the JMT statute there would be manifested a 
legal instrument that would require the categorisation of each 
intrusion into personal privacy into one of the three JMT 
strata. To set aside all three JMT strata would require the clear 
and direct amendment of the JMT statute, which would prove 
politically costly.  
 
                                                
97 Id. at art. 35(3).  
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Indeed, the political costs of undermining the architectural 
edifice of a JMT model privacy statute in the UK would be such 
a heavy cost that it would far outweigh the cost of the State as 
sovereign accepting greater protection for the citizenry of the 
UK from a particular intrusion sanctioned by the sovereign 
itself than might have been politically desirable by that 
sovereign entity, even if it were the Parliament as sovereign in 
the UK.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this article this author has set out Parliamentary 
sovereignty as a flawed expression of legal sovereignty through 
democracy in the UK; but also outlined how the Simms 
principle mitigates these political flaws and corruptions. 
Furthermore, we can see that the Simms principle is a step 
towards a legal culture where both the judiciary and the 
legislature of the UK might create a semi-entrenched set of 
rights that build with more specificity on the extent of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 and Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, with respect to privacy, or the 
right to a private life in its broader, applied sense.  
 
From a critical legal perspective, this author has tried to 
suggest how legal narratology, while a valid method of 
interpreting the mythos of cases, is not beneficial when it 
comes to understanding how rights and social values like 
privacy may be protected from the worst aspects of a culture of 
political questions that force intrusions by lawmakers, State 
agents and the courts into our private lives. Better, this author 
feels that we build an artifice or edifice of some kind to 
undertake this protection, using the new (in the UK at least), 
more balanced Simms principle as a limit on Parliamentary 
sovereignty, thus mitigating the need for privacy to be 
longitudinally asserted as personal resistance. This author has 
been discussing the potential for a move from a narrative 
epistemology of laws to an architectural epistemology of laws. 
 
The construction of an edifice of privacy rights that offers 
up ultimate protection of some aspects of personal privacy in 
UK society is not impossible, it simply depends upon whether 
we can conceive of the UK Parliament limiting itself using the 
Simms principle, and setting down a constitutionally 
entrenched statute that requires some higher threshold for 
repeal, amendment and revision. This privacy edifice would 
accord with the principles of law and architecture theory as 
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they are tentatively explored for the first time in this article 
only if it were constructed in a robust yet porous way along the 
lines of the “JMT Model”. 
 
The process of constructing this edifice of privacy rights in 
the UK would not take much more legislative effort than the 
constructions of a flawed fixed narrative system of privacy 
rights protection has taken, and it would truly be more lasting, 
giving constitutionalised protection of privacy rights from a 
damaging, fixed common-law legal narrative based on action, 
the intervention of comity and the unsuitability of retrospective 
remedies for human rights infringements as described above. 
